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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
trated by the facts of the Barker case, itself, in which a man accused of
a brutal murder was free on bail for over four years. Society's interest
is given greater emphasis in amended rule 50(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
52
In assessing the possible remedies which could be imposed where
the right to speedy trial has been violated, the Court found dismissal to
be the only possible alternative and called it "indeed a serious conse-
quence because it means that a defendant who may be guilty of a serious
crime will go free, without having been tried."53 The Court considered
dismissal to be more drastic action than the exclusion of illegal evidence
under the fourth amendment. 4 However, this conclusion does not seem
to consider the fact that many cases reversed under the exclusionary rule
are never retried because the prosecutor realizes that he cannot secure
a conviction without the excluded evidence. In those cases where the
defendant is not retried, the charges have, in effect, been dismissed.
The development of the right to a speedy trial continues to lag
behind other constitutional protections afforded to the criminal defen-
dant. The Supreme Court in Barker has taken a step toward full protec-
tion of this right, but until explicit time limits are established, a substan-
tial risk of violation of this important right will remain in our system
of criminal justice.
FRED C. THOMPSON, JR.
Environmental Law-Expanding the Definition of Public Trust Uses
Public concern for protecting the environment has recently been
manifested in efforts to preserve the coastal wetlands.' Public pressure
has resulted in the passage of comprehensive coastal zone management
acts in three states2 and a variety of less comprehensive measures in a
52FED. R. CRIM. P. 50(b), reported, I I CRim. L. REP. 3014-15, provides in part: "The district
plan shall include special provisions for the prompt disposition of any case in which it appears to
the court that there is reason to believe that the pretrial liberty of a particular defendant who is in
custody or released pursuant to Rule 46, poses a danger to himself, to any other person, or to the
community."
192 S. Ct. at 2188, see ABA, supra note 28, § 4.1.
119 2 S. Ct. at 2188.
'See E. BRADLEY & J. ARMSTRONG, A DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF COASTAL ZON13 AND
SHORELAND MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES (Univ. of Michigan Sea Grant
Technical Report No. 20, 1972).
2FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 161.011-.45 (Supp. 1972); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 46-23-1 to -12
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large number of other states.3 One problem faced by legislatures when
attempting to rationalize, coordinate, and control use of coastal wet-
lands is that by attempting too much regulation they may encroach
upon property owners' rights protected by the fifth amendment's4 prohi-
bition against taking property without just compensation. 5 The recent
California decision, Marks v. Whitney,6 provides California (and any
other state in which a public trust in coastal, tideland, or navigable
waters is recognized) with a useful and creative means of avoiding the
"takings" problems when legislating for wetlands management.
Marks owned property on Tomales Bay, a bay affected by the
tides. A remote predecessor in title had received the property by grant
from the state. A long strip of his property consisted of land covered
by the ordinary ebb and flow of tides-that is, tideland. Whitney's
property was landward of Marks' and was so situated that Marks'
tidelands separated almost all of Whitney's beachfront from the waters
of the bay. Marks proposed to cut off or substantially diminish Whit-
ney's free access to the waters by constructing a boating marina along
the entire length of his tideland property.
Perhaps for the purpose of obtaining financing for his project,
Marks instituted an action to quiet title in which he asserted "complete
ownership of the tidelands and the right to fill and develop them."
'7
Whitney counterclaimed alleging a right to free access to the waters
upon which his land fronted. He based his claim on rights accruing to
himself as a littoral owner and as a member of the public. His public
claim was based on California law, which holds tidelands to be public
trust lands burdened with public-trust easements.8
(Supp. 1970); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.286x (Supp. 1971). In about half of the remaining
coastal states major studies of coastal wetlands have been undertaken. See E. BRADLEY & J.
ARMSTRONG, supra note 1, at 58.
1d. at 9-18.
'U.S. CONST. amend. V. In Chicago, B.&Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897),
the Supreme Court held that taking of private property for public purpose without compensation
is a denial of due process forbidden by the fourteenth amendment.
'Schoenbaum, The Coastal Zone, Public Rights and Coastal Zone Management, 51 N.C.L.
Rev. 1 (1972).
'6 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1971).
7id. at 256, 491 P.2d at 377, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 793.
'The landmark cases are People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913), and
Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912). California public trust law holds that, with
certain exceptions based on statutory interpretations of legislative acts of the late nineteenth
century, the tidelands of the state are held by the state in trust for the people. Any conveyance of
the tidelands by the state to a private individual reserves by implication a public-trust easement to
the state unless the legislature affirmatively extinguishes the trust with regard to the land conveyed.
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The trial court denied that Whitney had standing to raise the public
trust issue. It disposed of Whitney's claim to access based on his rights
as a littoral owner by granting him a seven-foot-wide easement across
Marks' property. The California Court of Appeal affirmed the trial
court's decision Whitney appealed to the California Supreme Court.
The supreme court addressed itself to four questions:"0 the first
considered whether Marks' tidelands were burdened with a public servi-
tude; the second dealt with Whitney's standing to raise the public trust
issue; the third discussed Whitney's rights as a littoral owner; the fourth
involved the problem of how to fix the seaward boundary of Marks'
property. Only the language used by the Court in answering the first
question is pertinent to the constitutional problem of "takings" inherent
in most comprehensive land-use regulatory schemes.
Not surprisingly, the supreme court found that Marks' tidelands
were burdened with a public trust easement. This finding was consistent
with many previous cases in which the courts had found the state's
tidelands to be burdened with a public servitude." The court did not
stop, however, with declaring the existence of the burden; it went on to
address itself to the problem of defining the scope of the servitude.
Public trust easements in coastal waters and tidelands, the court ex-
plained, had been traditionally defined in terms of navigation, com-
merce, and fisheries. 2 This categorization was not, however, exclusive.
Other uses, particularly recreational uses, had been recognized as falling
within the public trust servitude. 3 The court noted that tradition should
not be mistaken for law and that certain uses should not be favored
merely because they had been favored in the past.
In administering the trust the state is not burdened with an outmoded
classification favoring one mode of utilization over another ...
There is a growing public recognition that one of the most important
public uses of the tidelands-a use encompassed within the tidelands
trust-is the preservation of those lands in their natural state, so that
they may serve as ecological units for scientific study, as open space,
and as environments which provide food and habitat for birds and
'II Cal. App. 3d 1089,90 Cal. Rptr. 220,petition for rehearing denied, 12 Cal. App. 3d 796,
91 Cal. Rptr. 128 (1970).
"06 Cal. 3d 251, 491 P.2d 374, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790.
"People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Forestier v. Johnson, 164 Cal.
24, 127 P. 15 (1912).




marine life, and which favorably affect the scenery and climate of the
area."
The notion that public rights exist in navigable and tidal waters is
ancient in Anglo-American law; 5 indeed, its origins have been traced
to Roman law. 16 The reasons for the development of a body of law
dealing with public rights in waters are the subject of historical debate, 7
but they probably include the importance of water as a resource, the
competition for this resource, and the waxings and wanings of monar-
chical power in England. 8 By the late eighteen century the state of the
public trust law in England was essentially this: navigable waters, 9
whether owned by the sovereign or by private persons, were impressed
with a servitude in favor of the public. Regardless of who held legal title
to the land under the water, the public had certain rights to the use of
the water which the sovereign was supposed to enforce"0 for the benefit
of the public. The most ancient and frequently enunciated of these rights
was the right of navigation. Two other easements mentioned almost as
frequently were the right of commerce and the right of fishery.
21
When the American states gained independence from England,
trusteeship passed from the British sovereign to each of the states. An
early United States Supreme Court decision, Martin v. Waddell,2 held
that a state could, if it wished, assert its trusteeship to navigable waters,
that is, the question was a matter of state law. This holding plus several
other nineteenth century decisions23 seemed to imply that a state legis-
lature might ignore the state's trusteeship and systematically alienate
the navigable waters of the state to private parties free from the public
"Id. at 259-60, 491 P.2d at 380, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 796.
11A.W. Stone, Public Rights and Private Rights in Land Adjacent to Water, in 1 WATERS AND
WATER RIGHTS § 35.2 (R. Clark ed. 1967).
"See Note-State Citizen Rights Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome
to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 571, 576 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Greatwater Resource];
Comment, The Public Trust in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79
YALE L.J. 762, 763 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
"Greatwater Resource 577 & n.28.
'8For a good short survey of the development of public trust law in England see id. at 576-99.
"rhe definition of "navigable" has caused considerable confusion in American case law. See
Schoenbaum, supra note 5.
"Roman law favored the theory that the sovereign could not alienate title to the beds under
navigable waters at all. English common law, however, permitted alienation of title but found an
implied easement in favor or public rights in the waters regardless of who held title to the subsoil.
Comment 768-71.
2'Id. at 781, 783.
241 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
"Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S.
324 (1876).
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servitude. But to confuse matters, at the close of the nineteenth century
in the great public trust case, Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 4
the United States Supreme Court seemed to reverse itself and indicate
that a state could not completely abdicate its responsibilities as trustee
for the public of navigable waters within its domain.
The legacy of confusion from the nineteenth century concerning the
existence and nature of the public servitude to which the nation's waters
are subject has resulted, in this century, in much litigation. One of the
most interesting and important questions litigated is the one raised by
Marks v. Whitney: What is a public trust use?
As already noted, the court was correct in stating that the legiti-
mate and protected public trust uses of tidelands have most frequently
been defined in terms of navigation, commerce, and fisheries.2" This was
certainly true in California. An early California case, Eldridge v.
Cowell,27 perhaps limited public trust rights to navigation. Several years
later the right of fishery was mentioned as a protected public trust use.28
Following the landmark public trust decision by the United States Su-
preme Court in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,9 in which
navigation, fishery, and commerce were all mentioned as being legiti-
mate public trust uses, the California Supreme Court as a routine mat-
ter began to incorporate the trio of uses into its enunciation of protected
public trust usage.30
A few years ago, however, a new note crept into the California
court's discussion of the nature of public trust usage:
The nature and extent of the trust under which the state holds its
navigable waterways has never been defined with precision, but it has
been stated generally that . . .[uses] ...are within trust purposes
when they are done "for the purposes of commerce, navigation, and
fisheries for the benefit of all the people of the state."31
In City of Long Beach v. ManselP2 the trio of uses were described as
24146 U.S. 387 (1892).
2Stone, supra note 15, at 200,
28See note 20 supra.
74 Cal. 87 (1854).
2'Ward v. Mulford, 32 Cal. 353 (1867).
-146 U.S. 387 (1892).
OSee, e.g., People v. California Fish Co., 166 Cal. 576, 138 P. 79 (1913); Forestier v. Johnson,
164 Cal. 24, 127 P. 156 (1912).
3'Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 417, 432 P.2d 3, 9, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1967)
(emphasis added).
323 Cal. 3d 462, 476 P.2d 423, 91 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1970).
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the "traditional" delineation of public trust purpose. The court was
beginning to consider the possibility that navigation, fisheries, and com-
merce were not the only usages to come within the aegis of public trust.
In Marks v. Whitney the court has finally stopped hinting that the trio
is not sacred and actually has suggested a few new uses that fall within
the scope of the public trust easement and deserve the status of public
trust use. In recent years only two other state courts have spoken with
such expansiveness of the scope of the public trust easement." In
Menzer v. Elkhart Lake,34 the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted with
approval an earlier Wisconsin decision in which that court had said:
The wisdom of the policy which, in the organic laws of our state,
steadfastly and carefully preserved to the people the full and free use
of public waters cannot be questioned. Nor should it be limited or
curtailed by narrow constructions. It should be interpreted in the broad
and beneficent spirit that gave rise to it in order that the people may
fully enjoy the intended benefits.
3
1
The Wisconsin court has led the nation in developing a comprehensive
body of law based on the public trust."
Recently, the New Jersey Supreme Court joined California and
Wisconsin in announcing new vistas for the doctrine. In Borough of
Neptune City v. Borough of A von-by-the Sea,37 the court decided that
the public trust doctrine prohibited municipalities from charging higher
rates to non-residents than to residents attempting to use the city's
beaches. Plaintiffs had not argued the public trust as a theory of recov-
ery; the court supplied the rationale on its own. 38 Like California, the
New Jersey court observed that the traditional delineations of public
trust usage, navigation, fishing, and commerce, were no longer adequate
to meet the current needs.
3one other court, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, declared more than fifty years ago
that the scope of the public trust doctrine went beyond navigation: "it includes all necessary and
proper uses, in the interest of the public." Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass.
422,435, 89 N.E. 124, 129 (1909). However, this expansive language has not been further developed
by the Massachusetts court, although with regard to other issues concerning the public trust
(alienability, for example) Massachusetts has developed a comprehensive body of law. See Sax,
Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV.
471, 491 (1970).
3151 Wis. 2d 70, 82, 186 N.W.2d 290, 296 (1971).
3Diana Shooting Club v. Husting, 156 Wis. 261, 271, 145 N.W. 816, 820 (1914).
"Sax, supra note 33, at 509.
-61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47 (1972).
31Id. at _ 294 A.2d at 51.
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We have no difficulty in finding that, in this latter half of the twentieth
century, the public rights in tidal lands are not limited to the ancient
prerogatives of navigation and fishing, but extend as well to recrea-
tional uses, including bathing, swimming and other shore activities.
The public trust doctrine, like all common law principles, should not
be considered fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to
meet changing conditions and needs of the public it was created to
benefit.3
Of what benefit is this broadened concept of public trust use enunci-
ated in Marks v. Whitney to persons concerned with rationalizing and
coordinating the resource use of the coastal wetlands? The answer de-
pends on the influence of the California Supreme Court with the various
state courts and legislatures of the nation. The court has issued a clear
invitation to the California legislature to use the public trust doctrine
aggressively. The legislature can do this by incorporating into legislation
the finding by the court that uses of coastal wetlands for ecological
conservation, open-space, and scientific study come under the umbrella
of the public trust servitude with which the wetlands are burdened.
Public trust law is not a sophisticated or well-coordinated branch
of the substantive law.4" The use of wetlands for navigation, fishery, or
commerce may conflict with one of the other public trust uses. For
example, dredging a harbor may be beneficial for commerce and naviga-
tion but disastrous to fisheries. In 1967 the California Supreme Court
found drilling for oil and gas in the tidelands to be consistent with the
public trust because the activity was so obviously related to commerce.4"
The confusion in public trust law derives partly from state legislatures'
leaving to the courts the role of defining public trust use and of establish-
ing a hierarchy of preferred uses. 43 The courts, left to fashion the law
from a hodgepodge of fact situations, have understandably been unable
to formulate a comprehensive body of law.
If the California legislature is not interested in breaking the un-
blemished record of legislative abstinence from public trust law, the
language in Marks v. Whitney may simply be interpreted as adding
31Id. at -, 294 A.2d at 54.
4Comment 774.
4 Some writers claim that in a showdown navigation always wins. See id. at 774; Greatwater
Resource 649.
12Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal. 2d 408, 418, 432 P.2d 3, 9, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 407 (1967).
4For a general discussion of what some jurisdictions have done toward developing compre-




another few "uses" to the general potpourri. The trio becomes a quintet
or something more; "ecological preservation" and "scientific study"
join navigation, commerce, and fishery. Public and private plaintiffs
simply have another peg on which to hang an environmental law suit.
44
Courts will be obliged to continue the haphazard balancing of compet-
ing public trust uses according to their relative importance, except that
five or six uses will have to be juggled now instead of three.
This discussion is not intended to disparage the utility to environ-
mental plaintiffs of the addition of some new uses to those already
deserving of protection. However, legislation which is responsive to the
broad language in Marks v. Whitney would provide a far more powerful
aid to efforts to preserve coastal wetlands. The legislature, in its role as
trustee for the public of public trust easements in the wetlands, should
simply declare that the use of the wetlands, most beneficial to the public
is the preservation of the wetlands as ecological units of study, as open-
space, and as a natural environment for birds and marine life. Any
proposed uses, including other public trust uses, which are inconsistent
with these should be declared permissible only upon a showing that such
other uses will not substantially impair or harm the uses now given
priority. Any present use of public trust areas inconsistent with the
priority uses should be declared permissible only upon a finding by an
administrative agency that such uses are necessary to and for the benefit
of the public as a whole or do not substantially impair the uses of the
wetlands now deemed to hold priority.
Obviously such legislation is very broad in scope. An act by the
California legislature along the lines suggested above should not be the
legislature's final effort with regard to coastal zone management. More
comprehensive measures, such as those passed in Florida and Washing-
ton,45 are clearly preferable for dealing with resource utilization of wet-
lands. As a stop-gap measure, however, such legislation would at least
prevent heedless and unnecessary destruction of the coastal wetlands.
How does the holding in Marks v. Whitney enable the legislature
to avoid the constitutional problem of takings? First, a brief explanation
of what this problem involves: The United States Constitution" and
most state constitutions47 provide that no property shall be taken for
"Professor Joseph Sax sees great possibilities for protection of the environment via citizen
law suits brought to defend the public trust. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT 158-74
(1971).
45See note 2 supra.
"U.S. CONST. amend. V; see note 4 supra.
"E.g., CAL. CONST. art. I § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. I § 7.
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public purpose without just compensation. Occasionally land-use plan-
ning schemes involve limiting the use to which a private owner may put
his property to such an extent that the owner is deprived of all reasona-
ble beneficial enjoyment. When this happens, the plan or scheme is said
to be unconstitutional as to that particular owner since to hold otherwise
would, in effect, permit state action to "take" a person's property with-
out compensation." A coastal management scheme that contemplates
conserving vast areas of the wetlands could encounter difficulties from
riparian owners whose lands were rendered useless or nearly so by the
restrictions placed on their property. These owners could argue that
either the plan was unconstitutional as to them or that conformity with
the plan required the state to compensate them for the loss of enjoyment
of their property." Success of the former argument would effectively gut
the plan; success of the latter could be prohibitively expensive for the
state. Marks v. Whitney reveals one kind of activity, however, in which
the government can engage, even to the extent of severely restricting the
use to which riparian owners may put the waters abutting their property,
that does not require compensation to those owners. The government,
as sovereign and as trustee of the public easement in navigable and tidal
waters, may engage in activity for the protection of whatever uses are
deemed to fall within the definition of public trust. In doing so the
government is not "taking" anything; it is using what it already owns.5
As mentioned above," the most traditional use has been navigation, and
most of the cases that deal with this issue speak of the government
activity in terms of navigation or of commerce. 2 But, using the reason-
ing of Marks v. Whitney, the easement is viewed as a functional one
based on current findings of beneficial public use rather than an histori-
cal classification of certain immutable uses. Therefore, as the govern-
ment finds certain uses to be more pressing and others less so, the use
"In Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navig. Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376 (Fla. 1965),
the Florida Supreme Court held that absent a showing of adverse effect to the public interest,
defendant's denial of a dredge and fill permit to plaintiff, which prevented plaintiff from fulfilling
his dream of constructing a trailer park on Boca Ciega Bay, amounted to taking plaintiff's property
without compensation.
"Id.
-'See Sage v. Mayor, Aldermen & Commonality, 154 N.Y. 61, 79-80,47 N.E. 1096, 1101-02
(1897), for explanation for finding a retention of an easement for the public in any conveyance of
public trust lands by the sovereign, on the basis of the principle of implied reservation.
51See text accompanying note 21 supra.
"See, e.g., Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 171 (1900); United States v. 422,978 Square




to which the government may put its easement may change accordingly.
If what the government wishes to do with its easement is to restrict use
of public trust property altogether, that is, to preserve the property in
its natural state, riparian owners cannot complain that something has
been taken from them. Whatever rights they had, whatever the nature
of their ownership in the soil under the water, they took their property
subject to the public easement. 3
There is room for much abuse if the government carries the public
trust rationale too far. On one hand, there must be limits to the type of
use the government wishes to make of its easement. If the legislature
were to find, for example, that the most pressing public need with
respect to tidal waters was to derive revenue from their sale, other
aspects of public trust law must intervene to prohibit the destruction of
the trust.54 On the other hand, the legal theory of public trust easement
whereby the government can prohibit development of wetlands areas by
owners in fee of the subsoil will leave many persons who have made
substantial investments in coastal property with very little to show for
their expenditure and probably very little in the way of remedy. For
these reasons, fairness dictates that the avenue opened by Marks v.
Whitney be taken as merely a stopgap approach to the prevention of
wetlands destruction.
MARIANNE K. SMYTHE
Estate Tax and the Closely Held Corporation-A Nearly Fatal Blow to
Section 2036
Many a tax consultant who has a client with a majority interest in
a closely held corporation has been looking for a way for his client to
avoid estate taxes on such stock without having to give up control of
his corporation in the process. In United States v. Byrum' the Supreme
Court has provided such an opportunity. According to the Court's inter-
pretation of section 2036 of the Internal Revenue Code,2 the majority
"In Zabel v. Pinellas County Water & Navig. Control Authority, 171 So. 2d 376, 388 (Fla.
1965), the dissenting opinion found "the retained inalienable trust doctrine" to be sufficient
grounds to deny compensation to an owner of the tidelands denied a permit to dredge and fill.
5 Professor Sax devotes much of his article, supra note 33, to the problem of preserving the
public-trust servitude in spite of legislative indifference and hostility.
192 S. Ct. 2382 (1972).
'INT, . REv. CODE OF 1954, § 2036 provides:
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